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Executive Summary
At a time when one of the major socio-economic problems facing
the nation is the demand for more equitable access to a health care
delivery system which continues to be characterized by a rate of
inflation greater than the overall level, and when the Surgeon's
General of the three major military services are diligently searching
for the least-cost method of providing the care demanded by the
eligible population (which is now estimated at around 9 million
people) , the necessity for minimizing the number of the scarce health
care inputs devoted to military-related health industry is painfully
obvious.
The military services of the United States maintain an extensive
health care delivery system in order to ensure the appropriate level
and availability of care to the active duty forces. If only the
active duty personnel were to use these facilities they would operate
at only a fraction of that possible given the necessity to staff for
the military contingency plans. Thus, given the expansion of the
health care fringe benefit package of the active duty and retired
personnel, the non-active duty population for whose care the military
become responsible in one form or another have been allowed, and
sometimes urged to utilize at least a portion of this excess system
capacity.
The end of the draft and the resulting need to compete in the
marketplace for medical personnel, as well as the general inflation
in the health care sector, has spotlighted the increasing cost of
caring for these dependent groups. The question has arisen of
whether it might not be cheaper to shift some of this demand for
health care to the civilian sector.
(ii)
In this paper we examine analytically the appropriate considera-
tions and elements to be compared in this research point out the
crucial empirical work necessary to estimate such a model, discover
some of the ways in which the analytical construct can provide bounds
and directions to the hypotheses to be tested, and finally conjecture
some preliminary policy recommendations.
A simple analytical model incorporating the most salient features
of the components affecting the comparative costs of providing in-
patient care to the eligible non-active duty population in either
military or civilian hospitals was constructed. The model was used
to indicate the four types of empirical research on a regional basis
necessary to provide a truly minimum cost solution to the government's
problem of providing the promised historical level of care to an ever
growing number of eligible beneficiaries.
These include:
(1) Derivation of the true fixed and variable cost functions
for each regional military health care facility.
(2) The non-active-duty demand for care at the military facility
especially in terms of its sensitivity to "space-available" and prices
of civilian care.
(3) The analogous demand for care in the private sector in each
region.
(4) The regional private sector cost functions and thus the
potential impact of a shift from the military sector.
Further, though the analytical model we demonstrate the fallacy
of using historical regional costs for incremental (positive or negative)
(iii)
utilization impact assessment and show that it may be relatively
simple to satisfy conditions which call for less than "full capacity,"
or more than "minimum staffing capacity," utilization by the dependent
population of the military facility.

I. INTRODUCTION .
The military services of the United States maintain an extensive
health care delivery system in order to ensure the most appropriate
and timely care of the members of the active duty armed forces. Such
a system must be prepared to deliver the level of curative and res-
torative care necessitated by an armed struggle anywhere in the world.
Thus since at most instances in time the country is at peace, or at
least not engaged in full-scale wars, the health care delivery system
operates on the average at much less than its capacity.
The historical recognition of this fact and the desire to pro-
vide the maximum number of attractive fringe benefits to active duty
personnel to encourage (re) enlistment led to the allowance for depen-
dent-utilization of military health care facilities on a "space-
available" basis. The rationale was that since the physical facilities
existed due to contingency requirements for the active duty forces
and had excess capacity, and since the personnel to staff the facility
could be obtained at less than market prices through the use of the
draft, the marginal cost of providing dependent care would be
minimized in this mode of delivery.
The extension of the scope of the dependent care program under
CHAMPUS (the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed
Services) and its associated potential costs in the private health
delivery sector added impetus to the desire to "produce" as much
of the desired health care as possible "in house" - i.e. , in military
medical facilities and using military health care personnel. This
lead to the estimation and inclusion of non-active duty demands
for care when new military health facilities were being built.
Thus the physical size of many military hospitals tended to be larger
than that strictly necessary to meet contingency requirements.
The loss of the draft for both fighting force personnel and the
physicians and other medical staff necessary to operate military
medical care facilities, has been the immediate impetus to a rather
careful scrutiny of the costs and advisability of the continuing
military health care program. One of the major objectives has been
to identify not only the total costs of delivering care in the mili-
tary delivery system to the eligible population, but especially to
rigorously derive the marginal costs associated with providing
health care to the various non-active duty eligibles—dependents
of active duty personnel, retired military personnel, their depen-
dents, and survivors and dependents of military personnel.
It has been suggested in many quarters that perhaps the way to
minimize the total cost of providing health care to all groups is to
"shift" some care responsibilities to the private sector. In this
paper we examine analytically the appropriate considerations and
elements to be compared in such a situation, point out the crucial
empirical work necessary to estimate such a model (and which estimates
are lacking in our view) , discover some of the ways in which the
analytical construct can provide bounds and direction to the hypotheses
See, for example, the "Boeing Study" [1]. A combined task group
of OMB/DOD/HEW personnel are also just completing their study.
A Navy-specific study of the future of its health care system is
also underway.
to be tested empirically, and finally conjecture some preliminary
policy recommendations which may result.
We have chosen to confine our analysis to the use of inpatient
facilities and to emphasize a fairly standard method of graphical
analysis in order to highlight the expository nature of this
work. We believe, and attempt to point out in the concluding section,
that the ramifications of the analysis for the ambulatory care sector
are easily derived by extension and slight modification of the pre-
sent model.
Additionally, we have chosen to disaggregate the analysis to
the regional level because of the well known differences which exist
between various geographical areas of the country (in terms of
facility quality and availability, demographic utilization rates,
etc. )
.
We confine the scope of our analysis throughout to the question
of finding the least cost method of providing health care to the
eligible population as presently configured. That is, we do not
address the possibility of completely disenfranchising any group
of present beneficiaries or drastically changing the structure of
the CHAMPUS program. Such monumental policy decisions have large
potential inpact on the whole recruiting and retention picture and
thus would involve such significant spillover costs that a much
broader based model would be required.
II. AN ILLUSTRATIVE GRAPHICAL MODEL
In this section, we will introduce a very simple graphical model
of the costs to the government of utilization of the military and
civilian health care delivery system. At this point, we will not
attempt to describe the exact nature of the functions associated
with the various cost components, preferring to sacrifice details
for the clarity of presentation of the major elements of the model.
In Section III, more realism and rigor will be introduced.
First, we will examine the relationship between physical size
of a given military hospital, its number of "staffed" acute care
beds, and the actual utilization of the facility.
For any given military facility, there exists a maximum bed size
which implies a maximum possible number of staffed beds that we will
denote by x... Likewise, we denote a minimum staffed level of beds
by x , x e[0,x.J. This of course, relates to the real possibility1 m m M v 2
that "contingency staffing" requirements may play an important role
in the operation of the particular facility. We posit that the
total "periodic fixed costs", c of operating the facility are
dependent on the physical size, the number of staffed beds, x,
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where the physical size variable is subsumed in the functional form
and a is a direct measure of the difficulty of the expected case
load. Next, consider the variable cost, c , of operating the
facility. This will depend on both the level of operation for which
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Finally then, the total cost of operating the military facility






We picture the individual relationships in Figure 1 utilizing a



















Thus, the measure of the expected case-mix for a facility where open
heart survery was performed would be larger than for the same institu-
tion where it was not, ceteris paribus, since the staffing would of
necessity, be different, as would the amount of capital equipment
necessary.
Using the linearity assumptions we specify:
c
f
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2
(y-x) ye (x ,xM )
c =
Thus, because of the cost of staffing beds even if not used,
the total fixed costs rise (here at constant rate) after satis-
fying the minimum requirement of x , such that the distance OA
represents what is normally considered as fixed costs in production
theory. The residual c f - A for any given staffing level repre-
sents the cost of that particular level of staffing in excess of
x .
m
Likewise, the variable cost curve is segmented. This stems
from the fact that for any utilization level less than or equal to
the level for which the hospital is already staffed, the incremental
costs are relatively much less than for those utilization levels
above the staffed level. This, of course, is due to the need to
increase personnel and associated supplies as well as the "usual"
variable costs incurred as patient load increases from below the
staffed level. As the staffed level increases, the "kink" or
increasing rate segment of c shifts "out".
Naturally, as the increase in x causes c to fall, c f
*
rises. We can construct a family of total cost curves associated
*
However the absolute value of the increase in Cf must be less
than that of the decrease in cv from the combination of the defini-
tions of fixed and variable costs and the assumption of the consistent
choice of the most efficient methods to produce any given level of
output
.
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where A. = A + B_ (x. -x )l i m
Next, we consider the non-active-duty (NAD) population eligible
to use the military facility but who also have the option to use
the civilian or private-sector health care delivery system. For the
moment we group all dependents, of active duty and retired personnel,
and the retired military, from the various services together. We
shall subsequently note and discuss the effect of considering each
group independently.
It is clear that the NAD demand for care in the military or the
civilian system is affected by both monetary and non-monetary factors
For the purposes of this paper, we will restrict our examination
to the combination of the direct monetary cost and the time cost
*
to the patient borne due to queueing at the military facility.
We thus assume that the care delivered in the alternative systems
is of comparable quality.
If we let "p" be the average gross price per unit of private
sector care, 6 be the patient's coinsurance rate under the CHAMPUS
program for NAD personnel, and let b denote a measure of the
comprehensiveness of the coverage under CHAMPUS, then the total














where s is the average space available for NAD care in the military
facility. Thus, s will be a proxy in our model for the waiting
time faced by the NAD potential patient in the military facility.
2
If we let y denote the expected utilization of the military
facility by the AD population, then recalling that x was the
staffing level for the facility yields
2
s = x - y
2 1Assuming that y is exogenously given or known, y can be
expressed solely as a function of the staffing level, given the
*
For a discussion of the probable effects on utilization of the
patient's perceptions of the relative quality of the medical care
delivered in the respective systems, see Harris and Whipple (1975).
existing private sector price and structure of the CHAMPUS program.
Further, we make the interim assumption that changes in the level
of the NAD private sector demand will not affect the average price
they must pay. This is probably not true in at least some regions
because of the relative size of the NAD and non-military related
sectors, and this possibility will be considered later in the
paper. Thus, since 3 and b are exogenous (to the model) decision
parameters we may write
y
1
= f(x) || = f * x £ [X m ,xM ]. (5)
We next recognize the fact that the usual "demand" for use of
military facilities just discussed can be further influenced by
policy decisions to limit such use by NAD personnel through various
modes of temporary or permanent disenfranchisement . However, since
the actual utilization of the military facility by the NAD, y










=4(x;n), ^iO, ^- > , (6)
where n is the "access policy" parameter mentioned. For example,
a decision to exclude retired dependents as a class from use of
the particular facility would coincide with a decrease in n, and
la 1
a corresponding shortfall of y from y . Thus, 4)(x;n) is a
correspondence as illustrated in Figure 3 below. There we have
also defined the relationship ?, (x,y ) to represent the cost
la
of operating the military facility in terms of y such that
L (x,y = y + y ,a) = I (x,y ) .
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Note that in Figure (3.c), the points y, , k = m, i, M, are the
maximum NAD utilization or demand for the given staffing levels
x , k = m, i, M, respectively. These are each less than the associated
points y., j = 0, 1, 2, which are the levels of total utilization
for which each x. was the "minimum cost staffing level" derivedk
and presented in Figure 2 above. This stems from the fact that y (x)
2
in (3. a) deviates from the 45° line by more than y , i.e., that
1 - 2 - -
y (x) + y < x for each x e [x ,x ] . Very simply this reflects
the fact that the direct care demand response of the NAD group to any
given level of "space available" in the MH will fall short of that
space available. In particular for x = x, k = m, i, M, the short-
fall is y • - yv ' j = 0,1,2, respectively. This shortfall—or
more specifically the response characteristics of the NAD direct care
demand function, y (x) , along with the returns-to-scale of the
military facility production function and the relationship between
staffing the facility and the required prices of the inputs—i.e.,
constant, increasing, or decreasing costs—will determine the shape
of the direct care cost function, L(y ) which traces the least
cost method of caring for each given level of actual utilization,
given the "space available" effect. This curve is shown in sector
(3.d) of Figure 3.
Next the NAD's realized demand for civilian inpatient care
Z is given by,
Z
1
= G(yla ,p,6,b) (7)
3G 3G 3G . , SG
< and -r- i
.la ' 3p ' 8B * u iua 9b
°y
Again, since p, 8, and b are exogenously given we have:
z
1
= g(yla ) = gU(x)
}
(8)



































































The additional assumptions embodied in Figure 4.b are that
there exists a positive demand, z , for private sector inpatient
care even though the capacity of the military facility is under
utilized. This seems to be a realistic position given historical
data on CHAMPUS utilization in areas with excess military capacity,
and may stem from the geographical location of the patient relative
to the facility or bias against military medicine, etc. Also
embodied is a relative inelasticity of NAD ' s demand for civilian
care with respect to the military, which reflects the monetary cost
born by the NAD in using civilian care. Figure 4. a shows the non-
zero usage of the facility by the NAD (i.e., y > 0) associated
with the minimum staff level, which corresponds to the implicit
assumption that the expected level of utilization of the facility
2by the AD is less than the minimum staffing level, i.e., y < x .
Although the Figure (4.b) is drawn in a linear fashion, it
is quite conceivable that kinks or nonlinearities exist. For
example, if the cost of civilian care becomes prohibitive to the
13
family or the facility reaches its capacity, then the reduction in
la 1
y may not cause Z to increase at all resulting in a horizontal
segment in the function Z = g (y )
.
As the NAD demand for civilian care becomes effective, the
military's "contribution" to the total bill through the CHAMPUS
* 1program rises (proportionately) . Recalling that Z is the
CHAMPUS usage by the NAD population and denoting the usage of the
2
civilian facility by all other groups as Z > which for now we
assume is uneffected by the level of Z , the total cost of
civilian facility, N, is expressed as follows
N = N(Z 1 ,Z 2 ,y) = nCZ 1 ) (9)
where y is an exogenous parameter representing the type of civilian
hospital being utilized as the alternative source of care. For
example, y may be thought of as indicating whether the civilian
hospital is proprietary or nonprofit, a comprehensive community-wide
facility or one affiliated with a medical school, etc., which
effects its cost of operation. If we denote the military ' s share
of the total cost (CHAMPUS costs) as M then we have
M = M(N;p,6b) = M{ n (Z 1 ) ; p, 6 ,b} (10)
We picture these relationships below in Figure 5.
*
Again, at this juncture we are not concerned with the exact nature
of the relationship, which may, in fact, vary significantly depending
on b and 6 discussed above, the cost function of the civilian
institution, and the pricing structure and institutional relationships









Notice that point N, represents the fact that even with no
demand for care in the private sector by NAD users, there would be
a positive level of cost of operation of the civilian system for
civilians only. Additionally, the slope of M is less than 1
since the government only pays a percentage of the costs incurred by
NAD people under the CHAMPUS program. And finally, N
2
> N, to
indicate the presence of deductibles and exclusions under the CHAMPUS
program.
Finally, we are ready to put the pieces of our model together
in a graphical construct so as to facilitate discussion. This is
done in Figure 6, where the coincident axes have been joined to form
a more compact analytical construct. Since we are concerned with
minimizing the "total cost to the government" of providing health
care to the eligible population, we are interested in deriving the
la
"total cost curve," call it c (y ). This is done by utilizing the
la
curve L(y ) from Figure 3 above which indicates the cost minimizing
level of utilization, y (x) for each given level of staffing
V xe[x ,x.J in combination with the cost of CHAMPUS care as functionm M
la la
of y , denoted by M(y ) . The sum of these two curves yields
15
c(yla ). That is, adding Myla ) + M(yla ), V y
la
E [0,y* a ] yields
la
c (y ). We then "choose" that level of NAD direct care utilization
la
which minimizes c (y ) . This is the optimal level of care to be
provided in-house, y . From Figure 3.b above, we then may deter-
A
~la
mine the optimal staffing level x which generates y of utili-
zation. From Figure 6 it is also easy to discover the associated
optimal level of NAD CHAMPUS usage z , and of course the associated
~la ~la
segmented Direct and CHAMPUS optimal cost levels L(y ) and M(y ).
It is easy to see that in the case described above c(y ) is
la
a linear function of NAD utilization y such that the optimal
strategy will always be to either allow no NAD utilization (y (x)=0)
or to encourage maximum excess capacity facility utilization by the
la 2NAD group (y (x) = f (x) ) . To see this note that if f (x) - x - y ,







)] + ^y V y <; x
Then £(x,y la ) = [A+3 (x-x
m)+B lY
2
] + B^13 V yla ^ x - y 2
laWe have M = M„ - k • y (see appendix)
.






















Then for any given x minimization of c(x,y a ) with respect
to y yields:
la, . (° for h > k
y (x) =\ 2(f(x) = x-y g < k
where y (x) is defined 9 c[x,y (x)] < c(x,y a ) V y a .
We may then also define c(x) 9
c (x) = c[x,y a (x)
]
Therefore if we minimize c(x) with respect to the staffing level
x, we find:
(i) if y




thus the cost minimizing level of staffing is x , i.e., x* = xr ^ m m
where x* 9 c(x*) £ c(x) V x .
(ii) if y
la (x) = f(x) then
(x) = A + BJx-xm ) + 6-,y
2
+ M_ + f (x) ($. - k)
m 1 1
= (A-8 nxm + M + ky
2




X for 6 + h =• k
| x„ S + B :
< k
Thus the optimal level of staffing in the linear case shown is at
either "boundry"— i.e., equal either to the minimum allowable (x )
m
level given contingency requirements if the "marginal cost" of
*
care in the private sector (k) is less than the sum of the
*
k is more precisely the rate of change in CHAMPUS costs associated
with the change in actual utilization of the military facility.
See Appendix 1.
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incremental fixed and variable costs (6
fl
+ &-.) , or to the
maximum possible level ( XM ) given the size of the facility if
the opposite is true. Clearly these are not the most interesting
of the possible cases and in the next section a more plausible
set of circumstances is examined. However, before moving on it
is appropriate to point out the empirical research requirements
spotlighted by the foregoing structure and give some indication of
the reasons for their importance.
1. The true fixed and variable cost functions for each regional
military health care facility with respect to the levels of staffing
and utilization must be accurately known in order to derive an esti-
mate of the total inhouse cost of care functions. It is not at all
clear that any of these exist at the present time.
2. The NAD demand for care at the military facility and its
sensitivity to "space available", price of alternative sources of
care, again on a regional basis, is essential to being able to
predict the probable effects on utilization of changes in CHAMPUS
regulations or expected rates of inflation in the private sector
delivery system etc. This, to our knowledge, has been neglected
for the most part. In the next section we will demonstrate the
possible changes in the method the government chooses to provide
care for the eligible population.
3. Next, the NAD demand for care in the private sector
in each specific region must be estimated. We emphasize the fact
that this is not just the inverse of the demand by NAD eligibles
at the military facility. If we know that demand for y_ of care
19
in the military facility will be forthcoming at x staffing,
and y at x.^ (x 1 > x , y > y Q ), this is not sufficient to
infer that reducing staff from x to x will shift y - y
of the demand to the private sector, although it may. The magnitude
of this, or other, shifts will depend on the elements we have identi-
fied, and their relative magnitudes. This information is sorely
lacking at present.
4. Another extremely crucial piece of information is the
costliness of the private sector alternatives in the region as a
function of NAD demands. For example, if there is one major civilian
facility likely to be used by NAD eligibles shifting to the private
sector, is it a large teaching hospital (generally the most costly
type) operating at the threshold of increasing costs or a fairly
new underutilized Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) hospital
associated with a prepaid group practice. The different possible
answers to this question will produce vastly disparate estimates
of the cost of a given NAD population shift for care.
The myriad of possible combinations of "answers" to the estima-
tion questions just posed can result in extremely varied optimal
policy recommendations for staffing and utilizing military facilities




We again emphasize that the analytical structure presented in this
paper does not address the possible change in military fringe benefits
of a strict reduction in the eligible NAD population, but only the
decision of whether its best to treat the presently eligible group
in military or private facilities.
20
III. EXAMPLES .
Let us now consider an example which appears more plausible
as representative of a situation which might be observed at a
particular regional military hospital.
First, suppose that the region is fairly compact so that there
are no real geographical barriers to using the military facility
MH for care. Thus, the minimum level of CHAMPUS NAD demand is small.
Assume that the MH is a relatively new physical plant, built with
the total eligible population in mind, and hence that x is much
larger than the contingency staffing level x . Continue the
scenario by assuming that the private sector care available is
relatively costly, thus tending to make the low-cost (out-of-pocket)
MH "attractive." Next suppose that demand for use of the MH in-
creases approximately proportionately with staffing until x is
approached. Likewise, we posit that even though the gross price of
the care available in the local private sector categorizes it as
"expensive", the existence of the present CHAMPUS provisions ($25
deductible or a maximum of $3.70 per day, whichever is largest)
for hospital and physician coverage yields a net price which is not
an extremely effective barrier to the transfer of demand to the
private sector as MH staffing levels fall. Additionally, if the
civilian hospital is underutilized—e.g., 60% occupancy—while the
military hospital generally operates at close to capacity, the
combination of a positive incentive toward longer average stays in
the civilian hospital and the negative (or at least zero) incentive
to keep patients longer than necessary at the MH because of the
need for beds, could mean that a given reduction of Ay in
21
utilization of the MH due to a reduction in staffing, Ax, yields
an increased NAD utilization of the civilian hospital Az such




Assuming that full NAD demand for MH direct




) We have, pictorally
Figure 7
This possibility of longer average lengths of stay (LOS) for the
"transferred" care is not necessarily inconsistent with the historical
LOS comparisons which have shown those in the military facilities
generally to be greater than those in the civilian sector hospitals.
The argument here would be that the LOS data for the civilian hospitals
would tend not to contain the same proportion of more serious (thus re-
quiring longer stays) cases, even controlling for diagnosis, since
serious cases would tend to have predictably higher total net prices
(including physician fees) in the civilian than the military facilities
such that the monetary incentive is relatively strong to have these
procedures done under "direct care" rather than CHAMPUS.
22
Assuming that the civilian hospital sector is in a constant average
cost position due to its occupancy factor, with increasing costs
only as its capacity is approached, and that the CHAMPUS program
remains as historically structured such that average costs to the
government tend to rise toward a constant with utilization, we
laderive the qualitative picture of the CHAMPUS cost function M(y )





This is due to the fact that as deductibles are fulfilled the
percentage of the total bill paid by the consumed falls.
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Using a constant cost assumption for the production of care in
the MH and incorporating our assumption regarding the properties of







Combining M(y ) and L(y ) on a single graph and adding
their coordinates yields C'(y la ), the total cost of providing
health services to the NAD population directly in the MH and through
CHAMPUS. We are, of course, interested in finding the level of inpa-
tient direct care which minimizes this cost. This is accomplished
^ la





Emphasizing again that this particular solution is solely
a function of the assumptions we've made concerning the size and
operation of MH and the utilization and costliness for the alterna-
tives and costliness of the alternatives in the private sector under
CHAMPUS, it nevertheless serves to illustrate the necessity for the
25
careful empirical work discussed earlier.
For example, the optimal strategy in the illustrated case is
to cause utilization of the MH direct care facilities by the NAD
<> lapopulation to be y . This requires an associated staffing level,
x which can be found graphically by tracking backward in Figure 9
above. We also may determine the associated optimal use of CHAMPUS
,in Figure 8. We note that x > x , but less than x„ . Thus, in
m M
this case it "pays" (in terms of lowest total costs) to staff at
greater than the contingency levels, but still less than the full
physical capacity of the hospital. This is due to the combination
of the decreasing attractiveness of space available to the NAD user
as the physical size of MH is approached, the constant cost situation
existing in both types of facilities (MH and civilian) , the fall in
the marginal tendency to use CHAMPUS as NAD MH utilization rises, etc.
The relative magnitudes of these and other effects determines whether
* la . lathe y rises or falls relative to y and must be available on
a regional basis in order to ensure that the total health services
budget of the military is truly minimized.
Next consider a facility that has been "staffed" at some level,
say x, and where the expected NAD demand y (x) has been constrained
by some exogeneous force, or has been simply less than forecast due to
an erroneous prediction of the true form of y (x) . This corresponds
to being "off" the L(y a ) curve as shown in Figure 11 below, at
point E. Thus, having determined that y minimized total health
care costs C (y ), the decision was to "be" at point A. However,
the shortfall of utilization coupled with fixed staffing yields the
actual cost, utilization position at point B. Had this shortfall
been foreseen (and y a been such that it minimized C(y )) the
26
optimal strategy would have been to staff at x, not x. The cost
of this mistake solely in the operation of the MH is represented by
the difference B-D, or Mx,y )-My a ) • If in fact we observe that
this sort of thing actually occurs in various military regions (noting
^la *that a utilization above y may cause the same sort of problem)
,
n tA ~ la
>
io ( x v )
one should not use average actual costs, —
~Z^\ > to extrapolate
y
for the cost of larger or smaller levels of care, since the numerator
does not represent a minimum cost method of producing the given amount
of care. This seems to have been a prevalent practice in the past.
*
Recall that there is usually some"utilization slack" for any given
staffing level above y-*-(x) due to the fact that, in general,
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A simple analytical model incorporating the most salient
features of the components affecting the comparative costs of pro-
viding inpatient care to the eligible non-active duty population
in either military or civilian hospitals was constructed. The model
was used to indicate the four types of empirical research on a
regional basis necessary to provide a truly minimum cost solution
to the government's problem of providing the promised historical
level of care to an ever growing number of eligible beneficiaries.
Although the present model deals specifically only with in-
patient care, the general separability of inpatient and outpatient
utilization decisions indicates that a like analytical structure
for the outpatient possibilities on a regional basis can be constructed
with the associated direct and CHAMPUS care cost curves added to
those for the inpatient sector described above in order to derive
the composite optimum utilization and staffing levels for the
facility and region.
Additionally, the general differential utilization by the three
**
major subsets of NAD users of the MH necessitates that their utili-
zation be identified and considered. This could be done under the
general model presented in this paper by noting that the NAD demand
*
That is, in the military, "contingency staffing" is in general
related to the potential demand for inpatient care. Outpatient
staffing and clinic size, etc. is mainly determined by the actual
active duty complement and projected civilian utilization.
**
See, for example [ l ] for a presentation of data which show these
utilization patterns.
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for care in the private sector, z , is a function of the allowed
utilization parameter, r\. That is if n decreases to one level,
the dependents-of-retired, say, would be disenfranchised and would
cause a shift of some amount of care to the private sector. If
additionally, r\ further decreased to reflect a decision to shift
the retired personnel themselves, then a larger shift of care to the
private sector would be observed, etc. Thus, we should add to our
list of required empirical work the necessity for accurate projections
of the different catagories of NAD demand within the MH and the
private sector.
At a time when one of the major socio-economic problems facing
the nation is the demand for more equitable access to a health care
delivery system which continues to be characterized by a rate of
inflation greater than the overall level, and when the Surgeon's
General of the three major military services are diligently searching
for the least-cost method of providing the care demanded by the
eligible population (which is now estimated at around 9 million
people) , the necessity for minimizing the number of the scarce
health care inputs devoted to military-related health industry is
painfully obvious. We believe the present paper will assist in the
discovery of the optimal answer to the question.
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